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Abstract
We study the value of information on the quality of legal services by analyzing
the incentives of litigants to hire high-quality lawyers, the incentives of lawyers
to invest in quality-enhancing activities and the eﬀect of legal representation on
the decision-making behaviour of adjudicators.
In a setting where adjudicators have reputational concerns, we show that
better information over the quality of legal representation generates a trade-
oﬀ. On the one hand, it allows for a better match between the value of a legal
dispute and the quality of the legal representation. This also has the eﬀect
of increasing the incentives of lawyers to invest in quality-enhancing training.
On the other hand, better information over the quality of legal representation
may induce adjudicators to bias their decisions in favour of the litigant with
the highest-quality lawyer and this generates allocative ineﬃciency. We discuss
the implications of these eﬀects on the desirability of quality certification system
(such as the Queen’s Counselor system) in the market for the legal professions.
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1 Introduction
Eﬃcient legal systems are key for the legal enforcement of contractual relationships and
thus for the development of market transactions. This paper analyzes the functioning
of the market for lawyers, focusing on how information over the quality of legal services
impacts on the eﬃciency of the legal system.
Legal services are credence goods. Due to the sheer complexity of the law, litigants
in a dispute are generally unable to gauge the quality of the legal service they receive
even if they can observe the legal strategy undertaken by their legal counsels. Gaug-
ing the quality of legal services requires knowledge of principles of law and educated
reasoning, for which specific training is necessary.
Information over the quality of legal services can however be aﬀected by legal market
regulation. For example, restrictions on entry conditions in the legal profession, in
the form of minimum qualifications and experience, can contribute to ensure that a
minimum quality standard prevails in the market. Quality considerations are in fact
at the heart of the justification provided by legal associations and regulatory bodies
for restricting access to the profession (see OFT, 2001).1
Also, distinctive layers of quality may exist within the legal profession. In England
andWales, for example, the lawyers who appear in court to argue a case before an adju-
dicator or tribunal are divided into juniors and Queen’s Counsels (QCs). Appointment
as QC is a mark of quality and brings a number of formal privileges.2 In court, QCs
wear a distinctive uniform: a short wig, wing collar and bands and silk gown over a
special court coat. Furthermore, QCs tend to focus on more complex cases and usually
benefit from an increased fee rate per case. Schemes equivalent to the QC system exists
e.g. also in Scotland, Northern Ireland, Canada, New Zealand and South Australia.
1Shaked and Sutton (1981) explicitly analyze the rationale for self-regulation and on whether the
profession should, or should not, be allowed to retain monopolistic powers for quality purposes. They
show that self-regulating profession that maximizes either the relative or the absolute incomes of its
members will choose a size which is socially sub-optimal.
2Currently, following consultation with the judiciary and the profession, the Lord Chancellor rec-
ommends for appointment those practitioners whom have marked themselves out as leaders of the
profession. QCs are then appointed annually by the Queen.
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In other countries the legal profession has no mark of distinction or quality com-
parable to the QC mark, yet quality layers can still be identifiable. As described for
example by Rosen (1992) for the US, one can often distinguish between two categories
of lawyers. The first category comprises lawyers who graduated from elite institutions,
who are well-connected and influential in the profession. These lawyers tend to serve
business clients, charge high fees and earn high incomes. The second category serves
more individual clients and comprises lawyers who graduated from lower-tier schools,
charge lower fees and provide largely routine, non-contested legal services. Depend-
ing on the category, lawyers are then employed in diﬀerent law companies, with most
reputable companies employing the most talented and well trained lawyers.
In this paper we study the value of public information on the quality of legal
services and thus the desirability of regulation that provides for quality certification.
We consider the interaction between three groups of agents: the litigants, their lawyers
and the adjudicator in charge of resolving the dispute.
A lawyer’s quality is a multidimensional concept that encompasses knowledge of
the principles of law and their interpretation, quality to identify aspects of the law
useful to make the case in court and advocacy skills. In any systems of law committed
to precedent, such as the common law system, the art of legal reasoning is also the art
of drawing out distinctions and similarities between cases; in adversarial systems it is
also the art of fact finding and evidence gathering. We focus on the quality dimension
that is related to the ability to identify the underlying ‘state of the world’ (i.e., the
‘correct decision’, which can also be viewed as the decision that an appeals court would
take). We abstract from other quality dimensions in order to highlight the role played
by knowledge of the underlying state. Thus a high-quality lawyer in our model is
neither a better advocate nor is he able to substantiate his knowledge with production
of verifiable evidence. If quality matters, this is only because of the way information
about the quality of legal representation aﬀects the interaction between the parties in
a dispute, the litigants, the lawyers and the adjudicators.
We consider how public information aﬀects the interaction between all the parties
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in a dispute. We focus on the incentives of litigants to hire high-quality lawyers, on
the incentives of lawyers to invest in training so as to increase their quality and on how
the decision making behaviour of adjudicators is aﬀected by the quality of lawyers in
courts.
An important element in our analysis is that adjudicators have reputational con-
cerns and wish to appear able to identify the correct decision. When making their
decisions, careerist adjudicators take into account how their decision aﬀects the behav-
iour of the parties to seek an appeal and how the appeal outcome in turn aﬀects the
inference on their ability. Contrary to standard settings in the career concerns litera-
ture, in the judicial system it may never be found out whether an adjudicator’s decision
is correct or not. However, when the information held by the parties is reflected in their
appeals strategy and when higher courts are more competent than lower courts, in ex-
pectations, appellate reviews are likely to be informative as to the competence of lower
court adjudicators (see for example Shavell, 2004, for an in depth discussion of the role
of appeals as monitoring mechanism of adjudicators).
The idea that adjudicators may have reputational concerns is now well received in
the law and economics literature (see related literature below). Adjudicators may care
about how others perceive their quality either because of a general concern for prestige
or influence or because their reputation can directly influence their career and future
income. Empirical evidence indeed shows that the perceived quality of judges plays
an important role in their promotion to higher courts (see Levy 2005 and references
therein). Also, reputable judges often take prestigious and well paid positions upon
retirement from the judicials. It is not unusual for example for retired judges to become
arbitrators in commercial disputes or international transactions.
To study the value of public information over lawyers’ quality, we build a stylized
model where a lawyer’s quality is constituted by the precision of his signal about the
state of the world. Signals are soft information and cannot be credibly transmitted.
Lawyers can choose to invest in trainings activities that increase their quality. Suc-
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cessful training results in the reception of a quality mark or certification (as QC for
example), that is publicly observable. More able lawyers are more likely to succeed in
training. Parties to a dispute then choose whether to hire a certified or an uncertified
lawyer. A dispute is resolved through an initial stage where a lower-court adjudicator
makes an initial decision, and, if the losing litigant appeals, an appeals stage where the
appeals court makes a final decision. We focus on the reputational concerns and the
behaviour of the lower court; the appeals court is assumed to comprise only competent
adjudicators who take the correct decision.
In this setting, we show that better information over the quality of legal represen-
tation generates four eﬀects. First there is a matching eﬀect : better information allows
for a better match between the value of a legal dispute and the quality of the legal
representation. Low-quality lawyers will be hired by litigants with low-value cases and
will be paid a basic wage. Higher quality lawyers instead will be hired by litigants with
high-value cases and be paid higher salaries. In equilibrium high-valued disputes will
receive higher quality representation and obtain better legal outcomes, in the sense
that the correct decision will be reached more often.
A second eﬀect is the investment eﬀect. As lawyers anticipate that quality cer-
tification brings higher income, they will have incentives to make investments that
enhance their legal abilities. Note that since investment (or equivalently certification)
is costly, only the most capable lawyers will obtain certification and enjoy indeed higher
equilibrium salaries.
The gain for the litigants from hiring a certified lawyer stems from two more eﬀects:
the appeals eﬀect and the decision bias eﬀect. The former arises because a certified
lawyer brings the benefit of more eﬃcient appeals: he discovers and appeals incor-
rect decisions more often than an uncertified lawyer. This in turn leads to a greater
probability of the correct decision being taken.
The decision bias eﬀect instead highlights a potentially ineﬃcient consequence of
public information over the quality of legal services. This eﬀect is related to the pos-
sibility that information induces less competent adjudicators to bias their decisions
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in favour of the litigant with the highest-quality lawyer. It is a consequence of the
reputational concerns of adjudicators. It arises because high-quality lawyers hold more
precise signals over the state of the world than lower-quality lawyers and this better
information translates into a more informed appeals strategy. This in turn improves
the inference that can be made over the competency of lower-court adjudicators from
the decision of litigants to appeal an unfavourable decision. Less competent adjudica-
tors have therefore more to fear from high-ability lawyers. This bias may be the source
of excessive fees for lawyers and it induces a misallocation of lawyers among cases.
This decision bias eﬀect rationalizes the perception described by respondents to a
consultation paper issued by the Department of Constitutional Aﬀair (DCA) in the
UK investigating the desirability of QC systems or in general of marks of quality. As
reported by the DCA (DCA, 2003, p.23)
"There was a perception that QCs were now instructed in circumstances where their
particular skills where not really needed: for example because it might be thought that
judges would pay more attention to a QC’s argument, or because a simple equality of arms
was needed -just because the other side had already instructed a QC"
The bias eﬀect thus rationalizes the incentives to "pay more attention" to a QC’s
argument as one of reputational concerns and suggests that it will be less competent
adjudicators who are more likely to favour litigants with a QC.
An implication of our results is that knowledge of lawyers quality is not necessarily
welfare improving. When all the eﬀects are put together we find that better information
over the quality of legal representation has ambiguous eﬀects on welfare. Due to the
potential advantage that the appointment of a high-quality lawyer generates through
the bias eﬀect, a market equilibrium may be reached where there is over-demand of
quality. Litigants can end up spending excessive resources on legal representation
exacerbating the prisoner’s dilemma problem of any legal process.3 Furthermore, at
3The presence of a prisoner’s dilemma in litigation has been first pointed out by Ashenfelter and
Bloom (1993).
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the market equilibrium there is misallocation of lawyers: cases ineﬃciently arise where
litigants’ behaviour is asymmetric, with one litigant hiring a certified lawyer and the
other one hiring an uncertified lawyer. An increase in the quality of certified lawyers
then increases the likelihood that the correct decision is taken but it generates the
negative eﬀect of raising the misallocation of lawyers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the related literature.
Section 3 presents the basic model; section 4 and 5 discuss the decision-making behav-
iour of the adjudicator and the outcome of the decision process. Section 6 considers the
incentives of the parties in the dispute to hire a certified lawyer and the equilibrium in
the market for lawyers. The private and social value of certification is then analyzed
in section 7. Section 8 discusses some extensions whilst section 9 concludes. All proofs
missing from the text are in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
The legal literature has long debated the impact of lawyers’ capabilities in adjudication
(see for example Galenter, 1974). Consensus and evidence has been gathered on how
legal representation makes for a significant diﬀerence both in likelihood of recovery
and in amount recovered (e.g. Ross, 1970). A number of empirical papers have then
analyzed the dynamics of the market for lawyers and quantified the rewards from
training and specialization (see for example Sauer 1998, Rosen, 1992, and Pashigian,
1977).
The theoretical literature on the value and quality of legal representation however
remains slim (see Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989, Spier, 2005 and Shavell, 2006 for a
general discussion on the economics of litigation). Lawyers can aﬀect the probability of
winning through their (trial) eﬀort (see Hirshleifer and Osborne, 2001) or through their
information gathering (see Dewatripont and Tirole, 1999). They may then eﬃciently
inform the court (see e.g. Bundy and Elhauge, 1993 and more recently Che and
Severinov, 2006), or mislead it (see Kaplow and Shavell, 1989 ). We are not aware of
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any study that looks at how knowledge over the quality of legal representation aﬀects
the functioning of the market for lawyers. To the extent of our knowledge, our paper is
also the first paper to derive the value of quality of legal representation endogeneously,
from the interaction between career concerns of adjudicators and a lawyer knowledge
of the underlying state.4
Our paper is also related to literature on careerist decision makers, such as regula-
tors, managers or experts who try to prove their ability to make the correct decision.
For example, in Levy (2005) careerist adjudicators contradict precedents too often in
order to signal their ability, whilst in Iossa (2007) arbitrators with career concerns bias
their decision in favour of long-term players. Career concerns may also induce less able
bureaucrats to use soft policies so as to keep interests groups quiet and mistakes out of
public eyes, (Leaver, 2004). See also Bourjade and Jullien (2005), and Ottaviani and
Soerensen (2006) for recent studies on bias in experts’ advice.5
3 The model
The general setting
We consider a setting where lawyers make an initial investment to increase their
ability to understand legal issues. The most able lawyers can then acquire a costly
qualification to certify that their quality is above a certain threshold. When there is a
dispute, litigants choose whether to hire a certified lawyer or not. A dispute is resolved
through an initial stage where a lower-court adjudicator makes an initial decision, and,
if the losing litigant appeals, an appeals stage where the appeals court makes a final
decision.
For simplicity, we treat the occurrence of a dispute as an exogenous event and we
4There is of course an extensive literature on the role of information and certification for con-
sumption goods and services. References include, among others, Shapiro (1986), Biglaiser (1993) and
Lizzeri (1999). These papers focus on incentives and asymmetric information issues. We abstract
from these issues and focus on the interaction between the parties on a case and the behaviour of the
adjudicator.
5The paper is in general related to the carrier concerns literature, although in most of this literature,
and contrary to our approach, the quality of the decision is verifiable ex post.
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model a dispute as disagreement between two parties, P1 and P2 over the realization
of a state of the world θ. There are two states, 1 and 2, and it is common knowledge
that Pr(θ = 1) = 1/2. We denote by d the decision of the lower-court adjudicator
and by D the one of the appeals court. We assume that there are only two possible
decisions, d,D ∈ {1, 2} . A decision d = 1 (or equivalently D = 1) favours P1 and it
is the most appropriate in state θ = 1, whilst a decision d = 2 favours P2 and it is
the most appropriate in state θ = 2. We refer to d = θ as the correct decision and
we interpret the correct decision as the decision that the appeals court would choose.
Thus we assume that following an appeal, the appeals court always chooses D = θ.
We assume that θ is independent across disputes.
The lawyers
There is a large mass of lawyers who may work for litigants on a dispute or on some
alternative activities leading to an expected utility normalized to zero. Lawyers may
be of two types "certified" or not. Certified lawyers have quality r, whilst uncertified
lawyers have quality equal to zero.6 We denote by S the mass of certified lawyers. On
average in a dispute a certified lawyer observes a perfectly informative and unverifiable
signal of the state of the world θ with probability r. With probability (1− r) he
observes nothing.
We denote by w0 the salary of an uncertified lawyer and by w the salary of a
certified lawyer. w0 is exogenously given by the productivity on the outside option.
For simplicity we set w0 = 0.
Remark 1 Notice that given our interpretation of θ as the would-be decision of the
appeals court, the concept of competent lawyer refers to the ability to predict accurately
the behavior of the appeals court.
This market configuration stems from a training stage where lawyers choose whether
to train in order to raise their individual quality and from a test certifying that quality
6The analysis would be similar for a positive expected quality of uncertified lawyers, provided that
this is smaller than the one of certified lawyers.
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is above a threshold r. Untrained lawyers have quality ρ = 0. Raising quality from
zero to some positive level ρ ∈ (0, 1] is costly. The cost of training for a lawyer is given
by c, a random variable with a smooth distribution. We denote by S(c; ρ) the mass of
lawyers with cost of training to level ρ smaller than c. We assume that the distribution
of c has full support on the real line and that it is increasing in ρ according to first
order stochastic dominance.
Lawyers maximize their expected salary net of training cost. In our setup this
implies that a lawyer will either train to raise his quality to ρ = r and be certified or
he will not train at all in which case his quality will be zero.
The adjudicator and the appeals court
There are two types of lower-court adjudicators: the competent (C) and the incom-
petent (I). Type C privately observes the state of the world θ with probability 1, type
I observes nothing. Types are private information and we let γ denote the proportion
of competent adjudicators. The model can be generalized to continuous types.
The adjudicator has reputational concerns in the sense that he wishes to appear
competent to an evaluator E, his payoﬀ being equal to the posterior belief held by E
about the competency of the adjudicator. The assumption that the the appeals court
chooses D = θ allows us to focus our attention on the lower-court adjudicator (here-
after simply referred to as the ‘adjudicator’) and the interplay between adjudicators’
competency and lawyers.
The litigants
The litigants in the dispute (also referred to as ’parties’), P1 and P2, value a
favourable decision at V (1 + δ) if it is correct, V if it is incorrect, and an unfavourable
decision at zero; the value V varies across disputes and has a distribution with con-
tinuous positive density on the real line.7 The litigants sequentially choose whether to
7The parameter δ can capture for example the sense of justice of the parties or (in a reduced form)
the value for contractual parties of better enforcement of contractual terms (see Anderlini, Felli and
Postelwaite, 2007) for a discussion of the role of court decisions on ex ante incentives). Ex ante (i.e.
before a dispute arises) better enforcement can help to ensure better incentives for relationship-specific
investments and thus increases the surplus from the contractual relationship.
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hire a certified lawyer at salary w or a uncertified lawyer at salary w0.8 In order to
focus on the value of information on the quality of the legal representation, we assume
away agency problems between lawyers and their clients and assume throughout that
the hired lawyer acts in the best interest of his client and this is public information.
Remark 2 An alternative interpretation of the model is a situation of self-litigation
versus professional litigation. In this interpretation certification is the minimal quality
requirement to be a member of the legal profession. Then agents choose to be represented
by a lawyer or not (self-litigation).
Upon observing the adjudicator’s decision d, the party who loses the dispute can
choose to appeal the decision. This party then incurs costs AV for the appeal, where A
is a random variable that is realized after a decision d is made and before an appeal is
demanded. For simplicity we assume that A can take two values, A = 0 or A = A¯ with
respective probabilities q and 1−q.9 Moreover we assume that 1+δ > A¯ > 1−γ
2−γ (1 + δ),
which is suﬃcient to ensure that faced with a high appeals cost A¯, an uninformed party
never appeals, and an informed party appeals only if the decision is not correct.
We also assume that the private value of the correct decision is not too large,
namely δ < A¯. We relax this assumption in section 8. To simplify the exposition, we
also rule out the possibility that the certified lawyer appeals an unfavorable decision
when appeals cost is low, A = 0, and he is informed that the decision is correct.
The evaluator
An evaluator (E) observes the decisions d and D, whether the lawyers of the parties
in the dispute are certified or not and whether they appeal. Using this information,
the evaluator E updates his beliefs about the competency of the adjudicator rationally.
Timing
8This is innocuous and avoids mirror equilibria. Further, in practice the game is indeed sequential
with the plaintiﬀ initiating the case.
9The extension to a general distribution does not add much to the main argument.
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· Each lawyer decides whether to spend c to increase his quality and request certi-
fication.
· Disputes arise and states of the world θ are realized. The litigants sequentially
choose whether to hire a certified lawyer at salary w or a uncertified lawyer at salary
w0. P1 chooses first, then P2 chooses.
· A lawyer with quality ρ observes a perfectly informative signal with probability
ρ and nothing otherwise. The lower-court adjudicator observes θ if he is type C and
nothing otherwise. Then the adjudicator makes decision d.
· Appeals cost A are privately realized. Observing d and A the losing party decides
whether to appeal. In the event of an appeal, the appeals court observes θ and chooses
D = θ.
· The evaluator forms her beliefs based on d, whether an appeal occurs or not, and
the outcome of the appeal.
Equilibrium Concept
We use the concept of Sequential Equilibrium to solve the model. Beliefs are derived
from players’ equilibrium strategies and the strategies are rational given those beliefs.
4 The judicial game
In this section we study the behaviour of the adjudicator, given the choice of the parties
as to whether to hire a certified lawyer and given the choice of lawyers as to whether
to train and obtain certification. To this purpose we consider a dispute where party
P1 hires a lawyer with quality r1, and the other party, P2, hires a lawyer with quality
r2. In the game of course ri (i = 1, 2) will take value r or 0, depending on whether the
lawyer is certified or not.
In this setting, consider the following strategies for the adjudicator: C chooses
d = θ, whilst I randomizes between d = 1 and d = 2, choosing d = i with probability
zi. We now show when these strategies constitute an equilibrium. To simplify notation,
let π(d,D) denote the posterior belief of E following a decision d of the adjudicator,
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an appeal and a decision D of the appeals court.When there is no appeal, instead, let
π(d, 0) denote the posterior belief of E following a decision d.
Notice first that following an appeal, if reversal occurs, E0s posterior belief is
π (1, 2) = π (2, 1) = 0, since under our candidate equilibrium only type I in equi-
librium takes incorrect decisions.
• Behavior of I
Consider now the behavior of an adjudicator of type I. Since I is uninformed and
he wishes to appear competent, he will attempt to minimize the chance of his decision
being reversed in appeal, taking into account the incentives of the litigants to appeal.
The appeals strategies of the two lawyers thus play an important role in determining
the incentives of I.
Consider the expected payoﬀ of I when he chooses d = i. With probability rj
the lawyer of Pj is informed and if he observes θ = j, he successfully appeals the
unfavourable decision d = i for all realizations of A. If instead the lawyer observes an
unfavourable state θ = i, he does not appeal.With complementary probability, 1− rj,
the lawyer of Pj is uninformed. In this case, he appeals the unfavourable decision only
if the appeals cost is low, which occurs with probability q.
In light of these appeals strategies, consider E0s posterior beliefs for each possible
outcome. Following a confirmation of the decision d = i in appeal, E0s belief is given
by
π (i, i) = Pr (C | d = i, θ = i) = γ
γ + (1− γ)zi
since conditional on θ = i, a correct decision d = i is taken by C with probability 1
and by I with probability zi.
Suppose that zi < 1. Following no appeal when d = i, E can infer that either the
lawyer of the losing party is informed that the decision is correct or that appeals costs
A is high and the lawyer is uninformed. In particular, conditional on A being low,
E0s belief is the same as when there is a confirmation in appeal, π (i, i) , as only an
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informed lawyer who observes d = θ does not appeal. Conditional on A being high, E
does not know whether the lack of an appeal is due to appeals cost being high and the
lawyer being uninformed or instead it is due to the lawyer being informed and having
observed d = θ. The posterior belief of E in this latter case is given by
Pr
¡
C | d = i,D = 0, A = A¯¢ = γ
γ + (1− γ) zi (2− rj)
and we note that the higher the probability rj that the lawyer of P1 is informed the
more no appeal signals competency.
Overall we see that when there is no appeal, the posterior is
π (i, 0) =
q 1
2
rjπ (i, i) + (1− q)
¡
1− rj + 12rj
¢
Pr
¡
C | d = i,D = 0, A = A¯¢
1
2
rj + (1− rj) (1− q)
and the expected payoﬀ of I when he chooses d = i is given by
v(d = i) =
1
2
q (1− rj)π (i, i) +
µ
1
2
rj + (1− rj) (1− q)
¶
π (i, 0)
=
1
2
qπ (i, i) + (1− q) 1
2
γ (2− rj)
γ + (1− γ) zi (2− rj)
Let us now consider the case where zi = 1. In this case a decision d = j reveals
that the adjudicator is competent so that π (j, 0) = 1. In this case Pi is indiﬀerent
between appealing or not if the appeals cost is A = 0, and can appeal d = j with some
probability if not informed that the decision is correct.
• Behaviour of C.
Consider the expected payoﬀ of C when he observes θ = i and takes the correct
decision d = i. With probability (1− rj) the lawyer of losing party Pj is uninformed
and appeals when the appeals cost is low. The adjudicator’s decision is then confirmed
in appeal. In all other cases there is no appeal. It follows that C obtains
v (d = i| θ = i) = q (1− rj)π (i, i) + (1− q (1− rj))π (i, 0)
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If instead C takes the incorrect decision d = j, then with probability ri the lawyer of
Pi is informed and always appeals the decision taken by C. With probability 1 − ri
the lawyer of Pi is uninformed and appeals the decision only when appeals cost is low.
Thus, by taking the incorrect decision, C obtains
v (d = j| θ = i) = (1− q) (1− ri)π(j, 0)
5 The equilibrium strategies
5.1 Asymmetric case
In this section we consider the case where one party, say P1, hires a certified lawyers
whist the other party, P2, hires an uncertified lawyer. We then have: r1 = r and
r2 = 0, and in light of the analysis in the previous section we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 When party P1 hires a certified lawyer and P2 does not, (i) in equi-
librium the competent adjudicator chooses d = θ, whilst the incompetent adjudicator
chooses d = 1 with probability zhl1 ∈ (12 , 1] and d = 2 with probability zhl2 .
Proof. See the Appendix
The proposition above highlights the presence of a ‘decision bias eﬀect’ that arises
from the interaction between career concerns of adjudicators and a lawyer knowledge
of the underlying state. Whilst the competent adjudicator always takes the correct
decision, the incompetent adjudicator biases his decision in favour of the party with
the certified lawyer. Intuition follows from the fact that the appeal strategy of a
certified and informed lawyer depends on the underlying state of the world θ and it is
therefore more informative about the underlying state than the appeal strategy of the
uninformed lawyer. Since the decision strategy of C is correlated with the underlying
state, the appeals strategy of the certified and informed lawyer reveals information
about the type of the adjudicator that the appeals strategy of the uninformed lawyer
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does not. I has then more to fear from appeals by a certified lawyer than by an
uncertified lawyer, which yields the decision bias of Proposition 1.
There are two types of equilibrium that arise and lead to the decision bias, de-
pending on parameters value. The first one is a mixed strategy equilibrium where the
incompetent adjudicator chooses d = 1 with probability zhl1 ∈ (12 , 1). The second one is
a pure strategy equilibrium where zhl1 = 1. Intuitively, when zhl1 = 1 a decision d = 2
perfectly signals the competency of the adjudicator. However, when an incompetent
adjudicator deviates and announces d = 2, there is the possibility that the certified
lawyer learns that θ = 1. In this case there is a conflict in beliefs and Bayes rule doesn’t
apply. As we focus on a sequential equilibrium, the litigant decides to appeal when
informed that θ = 1, in which case the decision is reversed. For some parameters, this
eﬀect limits the incentives to deviate to d = 2, and yields a pure strategy equilibrium
rather than a mixed strategy one.
The corollary below highlights the implication of an increase in the probability r
that a certified lawyer is informed, that is in an increase in the quality of certified
lawyers.
Corollary 1 When party P1 hires a certified lawyer and P2 does not, the decision
bias in favour of the party with the certified lawyer is non-decreasing in the probability
r that a certified lawyer is informed.
Since the diﬀerence between a certified and an uncertified lawyer rests with r,
the probability that the certified lawyer is informed, then as r increases so does the
diﬀerence in appeals probability between the two types of lawyers. Other things being
equal, this increases the risk for the incompetent adjudicator of facing a reputational
loss through reversal in appeal when he takes a decision unfavourable to the party with
the certified lawyer. To reestablish indiﬀerence in the mixed strategy equilibrium, the
decision bias in favour of that party must increase.
To further highlight the role of appeals, consider now what happens to the decision
bias when the cost of appeals decreases.
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Corollary 2 When party P1 hires a certified lawyer and P2 does not, the decision
bias in favour of the party with the certified lawyer is non-increasing in the probability
q of low appeals cost.
As q increases, appeals when d = 1 and when d = 2 become more likely (for a given
zhl1 ). However, other things being equal, the probability of an appeal increases more
when the decision is unfavourable to the party with the uncertified lawyer than to the
one with the certified lawyer. This is because q does not aﬀect the appeals strategy of a
certified and informed lawyer who always and only appeals incorrect decisions; q only
aﬀects the appeals from an uninformed (certified or not) lawyer. Thus as q increases,
the incentives of the incompetent adjudicator to make a decision in favour of the party
with the certified lawyer decrease. To reestablish indiﬀerence in the mixed strategy
equilibrium, the decision bias in favour of that party must decrease.
Before concluding this section we note that the decision bias here discussed is given
by a combination of reputational concerns for the adjudicator and his knowledge of
lawyers’ quality. Lawyers’ quality per se does not lead to bias.
Corollary 3 When the adjudicator has symmetrical belief about the quality of the
lawyers, at the equilibrium there is no decision bias.
Corollary 3 then identifies the source of bias in the public nature of the quality
mark. Were the adjudicator not to have any information over the quality of the lawyers
representing the litigants in the dispute, no decision bias would arise in equilibrium.
It is the knowledge about the lawyers’s quality, rather than their quality per se, that
matters. It also follows immediately from the above corollary that the less precise is
the information of the adjudicator as to the lawyers’ quality the lower the decision bias.
Intermediate cases can be viewed as representative of situations where the system of
certification is imprecise.
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5.2 Symmetric cases
Suppose now that both parties hire a certified lawyer and thus r1 = r2 = r. In this
case, with probability r the certified lawyer is informed and an incorrect decision is
always reversed in appeal. With probability 1 − r the certified lawyer is uninformed
and an incorrect decision is reversed only if the appeals cost is low. Since the typology
of lawyers for each side in the dispute is the same so is their appeals strategy and there
is no incentive for I to bias his decision in favour of one party. Moreover, a decision
bias in favour of Pi would generate countervailing incentives to I because a decision
favourable to Pi would then signal incompetency.
The same conclusion holds also when both parties hire an uncertified lawyer and
thus r1 = r2 = 0.
Proposition 2 When both parties hire a certified lawyer or when both parties hire an
uncertified lawyer, at the equilibrium there is no decision bias: zhh1 = zll1 =
1
2
.
6 The market for lawyers
6.1 The demand of lawyers
In this section we derive the demand for certified lawyers. To this purpose we calculate
the payoﬀs of the parties when they choose a certified lawyer and study the incentives
of litigants to hire certified lawyers. We denote by l a low quality, uncertified lawyer,
and by h a high quality, certified lawyer.
• Case ll
If both P1 and P2 choose l, we know from Proposition 2 that zll1 =
1
2
and the
behaviour of the parties is symmetrical. Since Pr(D = j | d = i) = 1
2
(1 − γ) < A
(1+δ) ,
the losing party appeals only if A is low; (1− γ) 1
2
(1− q) is therefore the probability
that the final decision is not correct and it follows that the expected payoﬀ of a party
in case ll is given by (normalized by V )
ull =
1
2
+
µ
1− (1− γ) 1
2
(1− q)
¶
δ
2
. (1)
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• Case hh
If both P1 and P2 choose h, the behaviour of the parties is also symmetrical and
zhh1 =
1
2
(Proposition 2). An uninformed lawyer appeals an unfavourable decision
(which is taken with probability 1
2
) whenever A is low. An informed lawyer always
and only appeals an unfavourable and incorrect decision. (1− γ) 1
2
(1− q) (1− r) is
therefore the probability that the final decision is not correct whilst r 1
4
(1−γ) (1− q) A¯
is the expected appeals cost. The expected payoﬀ of a party in case hh is therefore
given by
uhh =
1
2
+
µ
1− (1− γ) 1
2
(1− q) (1− r)
¶
δ
2
− r1
4
(1− γ) (1− q) A¯ (2)
• Case hl and lh
If P1 chooses h and P2 chooses l, we know from Proposition 1 that zhl1 > 1/2.
Then, conditional on θ = 1, P1 always wins unless the adjudicator is incompetent,
chooses d = 2, the appeals cost is high and the lawyer is uninformed. Thus, 1 −
(1− γ) zhl2 (1− q) (1− r) is the probability that P1 wins when θ = 1.
Conditional on θ = 2, P1 wins only if the adjudicator is incompetent, chooses d = 1
and the appeals cost is high. Thus, (1− γ) zhl1 (1− q) is the probability that P1 wins
when θ = 2.
Overall, P1 wins with probability
1
2
+ (1− γ) (1− q)
µ
zhl1 −
1
2
+
r
2
zhl2
¶
Hiring a certified lawyer yields two benefits. With probability 1 − γ, it raises the
chance of obtaining a favourable decision from 1/2 to zhl1 which is valuable only if
the other party doesn’t appeal, hence the term (1− γ) (1− q)
¡
zhl1 − 12
¢
. Second in the
event that the decision is unfavourable and the appeals cost is high, the certified lawyer
may discover that the decision is incorrect and appeals, while there would be no appeal
otherwise. This raises the wining probability by (1− γ) (1− q) r
2
zhl2 .
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Hiring a certified lawyer however raises the expected appeals cost by (1− q) A¯ in
the event that the decision is not favourable and the certified lawyer discovers it to be
incorrect.
We then obtain
uhl =
1
2
+ (1− γ) (1− q)
µ
zhl1 −
1
2
+
r
2
zhl2
¶
+
¡
1− (1− γ) zhl2 (1− q) (1− r)
¢ δ
2
− (1− γ) zhl2
r
2
(1− q) A¯
Similarly the probability that d = θ = 2 is 1
2
¡
1− (1− γ) zhl1 (1− q)
¢
where (1− γ) zhl2 (1− q)
is the probability that an incorrect decision d = 1 is not appealed by the uncertified
lawyer. Thus
ulh =
1
2
− (1− γ) (1− q)
µ
zhl1 −
1
2
+
r
2
zhl2
¶
+
¡
1− (1− γ) zhl1 (1− q)
¢ δ
2
We define
u = uhh − ulh and u = uhl − ull,
and we are now in a position to characterize the demand for certified lawyers.
Lemma 1 For r > 0, u > u > 0 and, for a given salary w, the demand for certified
lawyers is characterized as follows.
(i) If V ≥ wu , both sides hire a certified lawyer;
(ii) If wu > V ≥
w
u , only one side hires a certified lawyer;
(ii) If wu > V , no side hires a certified lawyer.
Lemma 1 stems from the fact that, net of salary cost, a party always gains from
hiring a certified lawyer. By hiring a certified lawyer when the opponent does not, the
party ensures a decision bias in her favour (Proposition 1); by hiring a certified lawyer
when the other party also has a certified lawyer the party ensures that no decision bias
against her will arise. This is the decision bias eﬀect. A certified lawyer also brings
the benefit of more eﬃcient appeals, due to his discovering and appealing incorrect
decisions more often than an uncertified lawyer. This is the appeals eﬀect.
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The gain from a certified lawyer however is greater when the other party does not
have a certified lawyer than when she does (i.e., u > u). The reason is that the increase
in the probability of winning is the same regardless of whether the hiring of the certified
lawyer ensures a decision bias or eliminates it. Instead, the cost of appeal has to be
paid less often when favoured by the bias than when on equal foot with the competitor.
It follows that if the cost w of a certified lawyer is suﬃciently low relatively to the
value of the dispute, both parties will hire a certified lawyer. If however the cost w
of a certified lawyer is suﬃciently high, both parties will hire the uncertified lawyer.
For intermediate values of w, P1 who moves first hires a certified lawyer whilst P2
who moves second prefers not to. This result suggests that public information over
the quality of legal service generates a ‘matching eﬀect ’. Litigants to a dispute form
diﬀerent pools based on the amounts at stake. Those with high-value cases then hire
high-quality lawyers and pay a higher salary. Litigants with lower-valued cases will
instead hire lower quality lawyers and pay lower salaries.
We then obtain the total demand for certified lawyers, as given by
D
µ
w
u
¶
+D
³w
u
´
(3)
where D (v) is the mass of cases with a gain V > v (the decumulative).
Corollary 4 For r below some threshold r¯, the demand for certified lawyers is increas-
ing with r.
For r not too high, the gain for a party from hiring a certified lawyer is increasing
in the quality of the lawyer both when the other party’s lawyer is certified and when
he is not (i.e., u, u are both increasing in r). The condition on r is then explained as
follows. When there is only one certified lawyer and r is suﬃciently high that zhl1 = 1,
the certified lawyer never intervenes since he faces always a favourable decision by the
adjudicator. Thus the parties’ utility levels, uhl and ulh, are independent of r, implying
that the value u of hiring a certified lawyer when the opponent’s lawyer is not certified
is independent of r. Moreover, when there are two certified lawyers, from equation (2),
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the marginal eﬀect of r on uhh is (1− γ) 1
4
(1− q)
¡
δ − A¯
¢
< 0. The utility of both
parties decreases with the quality of certified lawyers because the winning probability
is unchanged but the probability of appeal increases. Therefore, in this case the value
u of hiring a certified lawyer when the other party has hired a certified lawyer decreases
with r. As a result demand decreases (weakly) with r.
6.2 The equilibrium in the market for lawyers
Consider now the supply of certified lawyers by looking at the incentives of lawyers
to train and obtain certification. In our simplified model, training brings benefits to
a lawyer only insofar as he obtains certification, which raises the salary from 0 to w.
Thus, a system of certification generates an investment eﬀect by creating incentives
to train. In particular, a lawyer chooses to train if w − c ≥ 0 and the total number
of certified lawyers in the market is S (w; r). The supply is increasing in salary w
and decreasing in the certification threshold r. A greater r corresponds to a tougher
certification test and thus to an increase in the cost of training.
In light of Corollary 4 and of the fact that S (w; r) increases in r we can now in
a position to characterize the equilibrium configuration, which defines a unique salary
for every given test for certification.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium salary w (r) exists and is positive. Further, w (r) is
unique and increases with r for r < r¯.
7 The value of certification
7.1 The value of certification for the private parties
In the previous section we have discussed the gain for a litigant from hiring a certified
lawyer, given the choice of the other litigant. In the corollary below we find however
when the value of certification is calculated at the equilibrium, the private value of
certification is negative.
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Corollary 5 (i) For V ≥ wu both sides obtain uhhV −w < ullV . (ii) For V ∈ [
w
u ,
w
u ) one
side gets uhlV −w > ullV and the other side obtains ulhV < ullV, and uhlV −w+ulhV <
2ullV . (iii) For wu > V, both sides obtain u
llV.
In our model there is a prisoners’ dilemma problem: the litigants would be better
oﬀ in the absence of certification. Intuitively, consider case hh. Here each party has
an incentives to pay a higher salary w to hire a certified lawyer in order to obtain a
decision bias in her favour. In equilibrium both parties hire a certified lawyer, pay
the additional cost w but obtain no decision bias. The eﬀects of hiring a certified
lawyer are then reduced to an increase in the probability that the correct decision is
reached (due to more informed appeals) and to an increase in the appeals cost (due to
certified lawyers appealing also when A is high). With δ suﬃciently low, as due to the
assumption δ < A¯, the cost of additional appeals dominates the benefit from a better
decision and the private value of certification is negative.
7.2 The social value of certification
Let us define the normalized social value from the judicial procedure net of training
cost as ω = Pr (D = θ)λ − A, where, with a slight abuse of notation, Pr(D = θ) is
the probability that the final decision is correct, and where λ is the external value of
a correct decision. In this function we ignore the utility of the adjudicator and more
generally the social value of the information generated on the adjudicator.10
We then have that the level of welfare achieved by the equilibrium allocation is
Ω =
Z w
u
0
ωllV f (V ) dV +
Z w
u
w
u
ωhlV dF (V ) +
Z V
w
u
ωhhV f (V ) dV −
Z w
0
cdS(c, r),
where
R w
0
cdS(c, r) is the the total training cost and ωll denotes the value of ω for cases
where both litigants hire uncertified lawyers, and so on.
10Notice that in our model the adjudicator’s preferences are linear in posterior beliefs on his ability
so that his ex-ante expected utility is independent of the equilibrium and equal to γ.
A value of the information on judge could be accounted for by incorporating a componant
κ (π) convex in π.
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Proposition 4 When λ < A¯, the system of certification reduces total welfare.
In the absence of a system of certification neither the parties nor the adjudicator
can distinguish between a high quality lawyer and a low quality one and in equilibrium
there is no incentive to train: r = 0. A system of certification then brings about higher
quality of legal services, which from a social perspective generates one benefit and two
costs. The benefit is given by the increase in the probability of a correct decision that
more informed appeals generate. The costs are the increase in the cost of appeals, as
certified lawyers appeal also when A is high, and the cost of training. When the social
value of a correct decision is small (λ < A¯), for society as a whole the value of the
increase in the likelihood of a correct decision does not justify the higher appeals and
training costs. As a consequence, the system of certification reduces total welfare.
In the rest of the paper we assume that λ > A¯, which for moderate training cost
suﬃces to ensure that certified lawyers are socially valuable. To discuss the property
of the equilibrium in this case we proceed in two steps. First, we study the eﬃciency
of the equilibrium allocation for a fixed supply of certified lawyers and in particular
how welfare changes as quality r increases. For this purpose we assume that the public
decision maker is able to control the supply S (for example through a tax on certified
lawyers), and we analyze the eﬀect of r, given S. We then show how eﬃciency is
aﬀected by reducing the supply S of certified lawyers.
Consider step one and fix supply S.
Proposition 5 Assume that λ > A¯. For any given r and for a fixed supply of certified
lawyers, the equilibrium allocation involves too many cases with only one certified lawyer
and too few cases with two certified lawyers.
Consider two cases with value V 0 > V each with one certified lawyer. The welfare
is ωhlV + ωhlV 0. Suppose we allocate the two certified lawyers to the case V 0 so as to
obtain V ωll + V 0ωhh.We prove in appendix that V 0
¡
ωhh − ωhl
¢
> V
¡
ωhl − ωll
¢
> 0
which implies that the welfare is higher when both lawyers are on the same case. This
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reflects two considerations. First it is more valuable to allocate lawyers on the highest
value case. Second, the decision bias reduces the value of having only one certified
lawyer since it reduces the likelihood that the lawyer expertise will be used by raising
the probability of a favourable decision. The consequence is that from a social point of
view the marginal value of having a certified lawyer is higher when the other party also
has a certified lawyer than when she does not. This is in contrast with what we have
seen for the private value of certification to a litigant, where the gain from a certified
lawyer is greater when the other party does not have a certified lawyer than when
she does (from Lemma 1). It stems in part from the value of a correct decision being
smaller for private parties than for society as a whole (δ < A¯ but λ > A¯). It stems
also from the fact that the society internalizes the fact that hiring a second certified
lawyer raises the value of the first certified lawyer by eliminating the bias.
Proposition 5 implies that the decision bias that arises under a system of certifi-
cation of lawyers’ quality creates a social cost that is given by the misallocation of
lawyers that the decision bias generates.
Consider now the eﬀect on social welfare of a change in r, the quality of certified
lawyers, whilst still keeping S constant.
Proposition 6 For a fixed supply of certified lawyers, raising the quality of certified
lawyers has three eﬀects:
i) it raises the social value of each certified lawyer (at least for r not too high);
ii) it raises the training cost of lawyers;
iii) it raises the misallocation of lawyers by increasing the mass of cases with only one
certified lawyer.
When λ > A¯, an increase in the quality of certified lawyers r has a positive impact
on social welfare, given the supply of lawyers. This is because the social value of a
correct decision brought about an increase in r more than compensates the increase
in the appeals cost. Raising r however brings also the additional cost that it raises
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the cost of training. Finally, for a fixed supply, increasing r has a cost in terms of
(mis)allocation of lawyers as it raises the mass of cases with one certified lawyers and
reduces the mass of cases with two certified lawyers. This stems from the fact that
raising r has a greater impact on the value of the first certified lawyer on the case than
on the value of the second certified lawyer. The equilibrium salary has then to increase
in such a way to discourage some parties to drop a certified lawyer.
We now proceed to step two and analyze the eﬀect of changing the supply of certified
lawyers for any given r. The eﬀect is shown in appendix to be
∂Ω
∂S
= x1
¡
ωhh − ωll
¢
zhl2 V1 + x2
¡
ωhh − ωll
¢
zhl1 V2 −W (S; r) (4)
x1 = 1− x2 =
f (V1)u
f (V1)u+ f (V2)u
To understand the above expression notice that additional lawyers will be randomly
allocated between the two types of cases, those with no certified lawyer and those with
only one certified lawyer. Then the increase in the mass of cases with one lawyer bring
a value
¡
ωhl − ωll
¢
V1 =
¡
ωhh − ωll
¢
zhl2 V1, whilst the increase in the mass of cases with
two lawyers bring a value
¡
ωhh − ωhl
¢
V2 =
¡
ωhh − ωll
¢
zhl1 V2. The increase of supply S
is then transferred to the two margins with proportion x1 and x2. The first term in
expression (4) is thus the expected social benefit from an increase in S. The second
term is the expected social cost from the increase in the cost of training.
Proposition 7 When 1+δ > λ, in equilibrium there is an excessive supply of certified
lawyers.
Thus, for a given certification standard, whenever the social benefits from correct
decisions is larger than the appeals cost but only to a limited extent, the number
of lawyers who choose to invest in training so as to obtain certification is excessive
compared to the social optimum. This occurs in particular when the individual value
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from the favourable correct decision, 1 + δ, is greater the value of a correct decision to
society, 1+δ−A > λ−A > 0. In this case the private benefit from reversing an incorrect
and unfavourable decision in appeal is larger than the social benefit. Private parties
have here excessive incentives to win, hence an excessive incentives to hire certified
lawyers.
8 Extensions
• Legal associations
On the lawyers’ side, consider the choice of r by a legal association that maxi-
mizes the total wages of its members net of certification costs, taking into account the
equilibrium condition in the market for lawyers. Thus, we have
max
r
Π = w (r)S(w (r) , r)−
Z w(r)
0
cdS(c, r)
s.t.w(r) solving : D
µ
w
u
¶
+D
³w
u
´
= S(w, r)
Training incentives and the equilibrium salary depend on u and u, where u and u
are increasing in r and S(w; r) is decreasing. Using integration by part, the level of r
chosen by the association solves
max
r
Z w(r)
0
S (c, r) dc
which leads to
w0 (r)S(w (r) , r) +
Z w(r)
0
∂S(c, r)
∂r
dc = 0
At the equilibrium the certification threshold chosen by the legal association equates
the marginal benefit coming from a higher wage being benefited by certified lawyers
with the higher marginal cost due to an increase in the cost of training to obtain
certification. As the payoﬀ of the legal association is independent of λ, there is no
reason to suppose that the choice of the association will be socially optimal.
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• Case where δ >A
We have assumed throughout the paper that the value of a correct decision is lower
than the appeals cost. When this assumption is relaxed, most of our qualitative results
continue to hold albeit there are some diﬀerences, which we highlight in the proposition
below.
Proposition 8 When δ > A : (i) uhh − ull < u = uhl − ull < u = uhh − ulh; (ii) for
V > wu , the equilibrium is hh, whilst for V <
w
u , the equilibrium is ll; (iii) both sides
obtain uhhV − w < ullV for V ∈ (wu ,
w
uhh−ull ).
At the equilibrium there are now either cases with no certified lawyers or cases
with two certified lawyers. The asymmetric equilibrium, where only one party hires
a certified lawyer, ceases to exist. The reason is that a certified lawyer is now more
valuable if the other party has a certified lawyer than if the other party’s lawyer is not
certified. Furthermore, the prisoner dilemma problem always arises but only for some
intermediate values of V . Provided that the value V is large compared to the salary
w, the parties are now better oﬀ from both hiring a certified lawyer than not, as the
gain from better quality decisions is now greater than the appeals cost. Indeed the
probability of winning is 1/2 in both cases, but with certified lawyers, parties benefits
from winning the "right" case more often. However, for intermediate values of V, they
end-up hiring certified lawyers at salaries higher than their values, due to competition
to create or correct the decision bias.
For this reason, it remains the case that for λ not too large (1+ δ > λ) the number
of lawyers who choose to invest in training so as to obtain certification is excessive
compared to the social optimum (see the Appendix). However, since no decision bias
arises in equilibrium there is no longer misallocation of lawyers.
9 Conclusions
We have studied the value of information on the quality of legal services by analyzing
how quality certification aﬀects the incentives of litigants to hire high-quality lawyers,
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the incentives of lawyers to invest in training and the decision-making behaviour of
adjudicators. We have shown that quality certification is more likely to be beneficial
when the social value of a correct decision is high or when training costs are low or
when appeals cost is low.
To the extent that the social value of a correct decision is higher in systems based
on precedent, such as the common law system, our results suggest that a QC system is
more likely to be beneficial in a common law system than in a civil law system. This
is in line with casual observation that quality certification in the form of a QC system
is prevalent in countries with common law tradition rather than in counties with civil
law tradition of codified law.
We have modelled quality of lawyers as the precision of the signal over the state of
the world. It would be interesting to extend our analysis to settings where lawyers are
also in charge of information gathering, as in adversarial systems, and higher-quality
lawyers are also more likely to find hard evidence about the correct decision. Being
partisans, lawyers have incentives to disclose only evidence that is favourable to their
case. Negative inference can then be drawn from a certified lawyer not disclosing any
hard evidence in favour of his case. In this respect, the reputational concerns of the
adjudicator and thus his desire to minimize reversal in appeal would result in a bias
against the party with the certified lawyer, conditional on no evidence being disclosed.
How this eﬀect would interact with the eﬀects described in the paper could constitute
an interesting topic for future research.
We have assumed throughout that the lower court comprises only one adjudicator
who may be more or less competent. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to
account for the possibility that the lower court comprises a panel of judges (or that there
is a jury) and then study whether cases with certified lawyers are better adjudicated
by a single judge as opposed to a panel (or a jury). Two contrasting eﬀects would play
a role here. On the one hand, assigning panels to cases with one certified lawyers is
beneficial because it reduces the incidence of the bias eﬀect. On the other hand, panels
are more valuable when incorrect decisions are a priori more likely, that is when there
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are no certified lawyers on the case.
Finally, we have considered a setting where, absent certification, information is
symmetric. It would be interesting to extend the results to setting where absence
certification, asymmetry of information exists between lawyers.
10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the case of a mixed strategy equilibrium where
0 < z1 < 1. This requires that
v (d = 1) = v(d = 2)
or
q
1
2
π(1, 1) + (1− q)π(1, 0) = 1
2
q (1− r)π (2, 2) +
µ
1
2
r + (1− r) (1− q)
¶
π (2, 0)
where the RHS decreases with z1 and the LHS increases with z1.
For z1 = 1/2 we have
v(d = 1) = q
γ
1 + γ
+ (1− q) > v(d = 2) = q γ
1 + γ
+ (1− q) γ (2− r)
2γ + (1− γ) (2− r)
since γ(2−r)
2γ+(1−γ)(2−r) < 1.
Thus an equilibrium with mixed strategy exists if at z1 = 1, we have
q
1
2
γ + (1− q) γ
2− γ <
1
2
r + (1− r)
³
1− q
2
´
= 1− r
2
− (1− r) q
2
where 1− r
2
− (1− r) q
2
< 1− r
2
.
Consider now an equilibrium with z1 = 0, then π (1, 0) = π (1, 1) = 1 and there can
only be appeal with some probability x after d = 1 if the cost is zero:
v (d = 1) ≥ q1
2
x+ q (1− x) + 1− q ≥ 1− q
2
but
v(d = 2) =
1
2
qγ + (1− q)
µ
1− 1
2
r
¶
γ
γ + (1− γ) (2− r) < 1−
q
2
.
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Thus this cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose that in equilibrium the competent adjudicator chooses d = θ and consider
the payoﬀ of the incompetent one if he chooses z1 = 1 in equilibrium; we have
v(d = 2, z1 = 1) = 1−
r
2
+
r
2
π (2, 1)
where π (2, 1) is arbitrary.
There is an equilibrium with z1 = 1 if v (d = 1, z1 = 1) = q 12γ+(1− q)
γ
2−γ ≥ v(d =
2, z1 = 1), for some π (2, 1) , thus if
q
1
2
γ + (1− q) γ
2− γ ≥ 1−
r
2
which is obtained for π (2, 1) = 0.
Now suppose that 1− r
2
> q 1
2
γ + (1− q) γ
2−γ > 1−
r
2
− (1− r) q
2
. Then it must be
the case that the equilibrium has z1 = 1 and the uncertified lawyer appeals when d = 2
with some probability x > 0 when the cost is A = 0. We then have
v(d = 2, z1 = 1, x) = 1−
r
2
− (1− r) qx
2
v (d = 1, z1 = 1) = q
1
2
γ + (1− q) γ
2− γ
and the equilibrium involves
q
1
2
γ + (1− q) γ
2− γ = 1−
r
2
− (1− r) qx
2
,
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. First notice that zhl1 = 1 for q
1
2
γ + (1− q) γ
2−γ > 1−
r
2
−
q
2
+ r q
2
;which writes:
r >
2− q − qγ − (1− q) 2γ
2−γ
1− q = 1 +
1− (2− γq) γ
2−γ
1− q .
The RHS is bigger than 1 if 1 > (2− γq) γ
2−γ . Thus for 1 > (2− γq)
γ
2−γ which holds if
γ < 2
3
or q is large, there is always an equilibrium with zhl1 < 1.
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On the range zhl1 < 1 we have
1
2
qπ(1, 1) + (1− q)π(1, 0) = 1
2
qπ (2, 2) + (1− q) 1
2
γ (2− r)
γ + (1− γ) zhl2 (2− r)
where the π are independent of r. Then the term γ(2−r)γ+(1−γ)zhl2 (2−r) is decreasing in r which
implies that zhl1 is increasing with r.
Proof of Corollary 2. On the range zhl1 < 1 we have
q
µ
1
2
π(1, 1)− π(1, 0)− 1
2
π (2, 2) +
1
2
γ (2− r)
γ + (1− γ) zhl2 (2− r)
¶
=
1
2
γ (2− r)
γ + (1− γ) zhl2 (2− r)
−π(1, 0)
where the π are independent of q.
Thus zhl1 decreases with q if the LHS is negative
1
2
γ (2− r)
γ + (1− γ) zhl2 (2− r)
− 1
2
γ
γ
2
+ (1− γ) zhl1
< 0
γ
2
Ã
2 (2− r) (1− γ)
¡
2zhl1 − 1
¢
− rγ¡
γ + (1− γ) zhl2 (2− r)
¢ ¡
γ + (1− γ) 2zhl1
¢! < 0
So zhl1 decreases with q if
zhl1 <
1
2
+
γr
4 (2− r) (1− γ) .
which holds for zhl1 =
1
2
. For q close to 1 we have
1
2
π(1, 1) ' 1
2
π (2, 2)
which implies that zhl1 is close to 1/2. This along with the fact that zhl1 increases if it
is above some threshold implies that zhl1 decreases with q.
Proof of Corollary 3 and Proposition 2. In a symmetric case the incompetent
judge chooses the action that yields the highest probability π of being competent in
case of no appeal. If one decision is more likely to be chosen by the incompetent, it will
yields the lowest π which would yield a contradiction. Thus both decisions are chosen
with the same probability.
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.Proof of Lemma 1.
Straightforward computations yield
u = (1− γ) (1− q) 1
2
µ¡
2zhl1 − 1 + rzhl2
¢
+
µ
zhl1 −
1
2
(1− r)
¶
δ − r1
2
A¯
¶
> (1− γ) (1− q) r
4
¡
1 + δ − A¯
¢
> 0
and
u = (1− γ) (1− q) 1
2
µ¡
2zhl1 − 1 + rzhl2
¢
+
µ
1
2
− zhl2 (1− r)
¶
δ − zhl2 rA¯
¶
> (1− γ) (1− q) r
4
¡
1 + δ − A¯
¢
> 0.
Thus
u− u = (1− γ) (1− q) 1
2
µ
zhl1 −
1
2
¶
r
¡
A¯− δ
¢
Suppose w < V uhh − V ulh ≡ V u. Then the second mover always chooses h. The first
mover chooses h since it prefers to pay w to induce (h, h) .
Suppose w > V uhl − V ull ≡ V u, then the second mover always chooses l. The first
mover then prefers l since V ull > V uhl − w.
Suppose now that V uhl − V ull > w > V uhh − V ulh. The second mover chooses h if
the first mover chooses l and h otherwise. The first mover chooses between V uhl−w and
V ulh. But V uhl − V ulh > V uhl − V ull > w (because ulh < ull) so she prefers (h, l) .
Proof of Corollary 4.
Since D is non-increasing it suﬃces to show that u and u are non-decreasing with
r.
∂u
∂r
= (1− γ) (1− q) 1
2
∙
(2− r) ∂z
hl
1
∂r
+ (1− r) δz0 (r) + rA¯∂z
hl
1
∂r
+ zhl2
¡
1 + δ − A¯
¢¸
is positive since ∂z
hl
1
∂r ≥ 0.
∂u
∂r
= (1− γ) (1− q) 1
2
∙
(2− r) ∂z
hl
1
∂r
+
∂zhl1
∂r
δ + 1− zhl1 +
1
2
¡
δ − A¯
¢¸
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is positive if zhl1 < 1 +
1
2
¡
δ − A¯
¢
. Since zhl1 (r) is non-decreasing and z1 (0) = 1/2 and
1− 1
2
+ δ
2
− 1
2
A¯ > 0, there exists r¯ such that ∂u∂r ≥ 0 if r ≤ r¯.
Proof of Proposition 3. An equilibrium verifies S (w, r) = D
³
w
u
´
+D
¡
w
u
¢
and
exists at a positive salary since S (0, r) = 0 < 2D (0) and D
³
w
u
´
+D
¡
w
u
¢
converges to
0 when w goes to infinity. On the range where r ≤ r¯, S(w, r) decreases with r while
D
³
w
u
´
+ D
¡
w
u
¢
is non-decreasing with r. Thus the equilibrium salary increases with
r.
Proof of Corollary 5.
uhh = ull + (1− γ) 1
4
(1− q) r
¡
δ − A¯
¢
< ull
On the range V ∈
h
w
u ,
w
u
i
we have uhlV − w > ull. Moreover
ulh = ull − (1− γ) (1− q)
µ
zhl1 −
1
2
+
r
2
z2
¶
− (1− γ) (1− q)
µ
zhl1 −
1
2
¶
δ
2
< ull
and
uhl + ulh = 2ull + (1− γ) zhl2 (1− q)
r
2
¡
δ − A¯
¢
< 2ull,
which give the results.
Proof of Proposition 4.
First note that in the absence of certification, welfare is ωll since quality is unob-
servable and lawyers have no incentives to train. Then note
ωll =
µ
1− (1− γ) 1
2
(1− q)
¶
λ
ωhh =
µ
1− (1− γ) 1
2
(1− q) (1− r)
¶
λ− r1
2
(1− γ) (1− q) A¯
= ωll +
r
2
(1− γ) (1− q)
¡
λ− A¯
¢
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ωhl =
¡
1− (1− γ) zhl2 (1− q) (1− r)
¢ λ
2
+
¡
1− (1− γ) zhl1 (1− q)
¢ λ
2
− (1− γ) zhl2
r
2
(1− q) A¯
=
¡
1− (1− γ) zhl2 (1− q)
¢ λ
2
+
¡
1− (1− γ) zhl1 (1− q)
¢ λ
2
+ (1− γ) zhl2 (1− q)
r
2
¡
λ− A¯
¢
= ωll + zhl2
r
2
(1− γ) (1− q)
¡
λ− A¯
¢
with
2ωhl − ωhh − ωll =
¡
1− 2zhl1
¢ r
2
(1− γ) (1− q)
¡
λ− A¯
¢
And if λ < A¯ : ωhh < ωhl < ωll and 2ωhl > ωhh + ωll. For λ < A¯ we then haveZ w
u
0
ωllV f (V ) dV+
Z w
u
w
u
ωhlV dF (V )+
Z V
w
u
ωhhV f (V ) dV−
Z wΨ(r)
0
cg(c)dc <
Z V
0
ωllV f (V ) dV
since
R w
u
0
ωllV f (V ) dV +
R w
u
w
u
ωhlV dF (V ) +
R V
w
u
ωhhV f (V ) dV <
R V¯
0
ωllV f (V ) dV .
Proof of Proposition 5. DefineW (S; r) as the level of w−τ solving S(w−τ ; r) =
S. Given S, let V1 = wu and V2 =
w
u denote the cutoﬀ values. They are solutions ofZ V
V1
f (V ) dV +
Z V
V2
f (V ) dV = S (5)
V1u = V2u (=W (S; r) + τ) (6)
and we can define the level of welfare achieved by the equilibrium allocation as
Ω =
Z V1
0
ωllV f (V ) dV +
Z V2
V1
ωhlV f (V ) dV +
Z V
V2
ωhhV f (V ) dV −
Z W (S;r)
0
cdS(c, r).
(7)
Note that for λ > A¯ : ωhh > ωhl > ωll and 2ωhl < ωhh+ωll. Consider an allocation
in the thresholds V1 and V2, where cases with value V ∈ [V1, V2] have one certified
lawyer and cases with value V > V2 have two certified lawyers. The allocation must
satisfy S = D (V1) + D (V2) . Suppose we change V1 and adjust V2 to maintain the
supply, then ∂V2∂V1 = −
f(V1)
f(V2)
and
∂Ω
∂V1
¯¯¯¯
S=cst
=
¡
ωll − ωhl
¢
V1f (V1) +
¡
ωhl − ωhh
¢
V2f (V2)
µ
−f (V1)
f (V2)
¶
=
¡
−
¡
ωhl − ωll
¢
V1 +
¡
ωhh − ωhl
¢
V2
¢
f (V1)
35
Evaluated at the equilibrium we obtain
∂Ω
∂V1
¯¯¯¯
S=cst
=
µ
−
µ
ωhl − ωll
u
¶
+
µ
ωhh − ωhl
u
¶¶
f
³w
u
´
w > 0,
thus increasing V1 would raise welfare.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Diﬀerentiating (7) with respect to r, and usingZ W (S,r)
0
c
∂S(c, r)
∂c
dc =W (S, r)S −
Z W (S,r)
0
S (c, r) dc,
we have
∂Ω
∂r
=
¡
ωll − ωhl
¢
V1f (V1)
∂V1
∂r
+
¡
ωhl − ωhh
¢
V2f (V2)
∂V2
∂r
+
Z W (S;r)
0
∂S(c, r)
∂r
dc
+
Z V2
V1
∂ωhl
∂r
V f (V ) dV +
Z V
V2
∂ωhh
∂r
V f (V ) dV
Using
∂ωhh
∂r
=
ωhh − ωll
r
=
1
2
(1− γ) (1− q)
¡
λ− A¯
¢
and
∂ωhl
∂r
=
ωhl − ωll
r
− ω
hl − ωll
zhl2
∂zhl1
∂r
=
µ
zhl2 − r
∂zhl1
∂r
¶
1
2
(1− γ) (1− q)
¡
λ− A¯
¢
=
µ
zhl2 − r
∂zhl1
∂r
¶
ωhh − ωll
r
we obtain
∂Ω
∂r
=
¡
ωll − ωhl
¢
V1f (V1)
∂V1
∂r
+
¡
ωhl − ωhh
¢
V2f (V2)
∂V2
∂r
+
Z W (S;r)
0
∂S(c, r)
∂r
dc
+
µ
ωhh − ωll
r
¶Ãµ
zhl2 − r
∂zhl1
∂r
¶Z V2
V1
V f (V ) dV +
Z V
V2
V f (V ) dV
!
Using
ωhh − ωll = r
2
(1− γ) (1− q)
¡
λ− A¯
¢
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ωhl − ωll = zhl2
r
2
(1− γ) (1− q)
¡
λ− A¯
¢
= zhl2
¡
ωhh − ωll
¢
(8)
ωhh − ωhl = zhl1
¡
ωhh − ωll
¢
(9)
we obtain the eﬀect on welfare of an increase in r
∂Ω
∂r
= −
¡
ωhh − ωll
¢µ
zhl2 V1f (V1)
∂V1
∂r
+ zhl1 V2f (V2)
∂V2
∂r
¶
+
Z W (S;r)
0
∂S(c, r)
∂r
dc
+
µ
ωhh − ωll
r
¶Ãµ
zhl2 − r
∂zhl1
∂r
¶Z V2
V1
V f (V ) dV +
Z V
V2
V f (V ) dV
!
The last term measures the impact of increasing the quality r for a given allocation of
lawyers, and it is positive if zhl1 is not too large. The second term is negative and it
captures the fact that increasing r for a given supply requires that more lawyers train
and thus increases the cost. The first term is the impact of the reallocation of lawyers
between cases for a given supply. Using V1f (V1) ∂V1∂r = −V2f (V2)
∂V2
∂r , this first eﬀect is
−
¡
ωhh − ωll
¢µ
zhl2 V1f (V1)
∂V1
∂r
+ zhl1 V2f (V2)
∂V2
∂r
¶
=
¡
ωhh − ωll
¢ ¡
2zhl1 − 1
¢
V1f (V1)
∂V1
∂r
which has the same sign as ∂V1∂r . The following lemma then establishes this sign.
Lemma 2 For a fixed supply, increasing the quality of certified lawyers raises the mass
of cases with one certified lawyers and reduces the mass of cases with two certified
lawyers: ∂V1∂r
¯¯
S < 0 <
∂V2
∂r
¯¯
S.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Since V1u = V2u
1
V1
∂V1
∂r
− 1
V2
∂V2
∂r
=
1
u
∂u
∂r
− 1
u
∂u
∂r
Since ∂V1∂r and
∂V2
∂r have opposite signs,
∂V1
∂r < 0 if the RHS is negative which is equivalent
to ∂∂r
³
u
u
´
> 0. Now uu = 1 +
r(zhl1 −12)(A¯−δ)
(zhl1 −12)(2+δ−r)+
r
2(1+δ−A¯)
, so that
∂
∂r
µ
u
u
¶
=
∂
∂r
⎛
⎝ A¯− δ¡
2+δ−r
r
¢
+
³
1+δ−A¯
2zhl1 −1
´
⎞
⎠ > 0
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Hence the result.
Derivation of expression 4. To analyze the eﬀect of a change in S whilst
keeping r constant suppose there is a tax τ on certified lawyers that is paid upon
successful certification. Then, defining V1 = wu and V2 =
w
u , the equilibrium conditions
are Z V
V1
f (V ) dV +
Z V
V2
f (V ) dV = S(w − τ ; r);
w = uV1 = uV2
and choosing τ at given r is equivalent to choosing the supply S and consequently the
wage. Indeed we have
τ = w −W (S; r)
where W (S; r) defines the level of w solving S(w; r) = S.
Then diﬀerentiating (7) with respect to S, using (9) and (8) we obtain
∂Ω
∂S
= −
¡
ωhh − ωll
¢µ
zhl2 V1f (V1)
∂V1
∂S
+ zhl1 V2f (V2)
∂V2
∂S
¶
−W (S; r)
which equates the gain in judicial decisions with the cost of additional certified lawyers.
Using (5) and (6), the optimal level of S solves
f (V1)
∂V1
∂S
+ f (V2)
∂V2
∂S
= −1;
∂V1
∂S
u =
∂V2
∂S
u.
which yields
∂V1
∂S
=
−u
f (V1)u+ f (V2)u
∂V2
∂S
=
−u
f (V1)u+ f (V2)u
and substituting back into ∂Ω∂S we have expression 4.
Proof of Proposition 7. From (4), at the optimal supply we have¡
ωhh − ωll
¢ f (V1)uzhl2 V1 + f (V2)uzhl1 V2
f (V1)u+ f (V2)u
=W (S; r)
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Using W (S; r) = w − τ and w = V1u = V2u, we have
¡
ωhh − ωll
¢ f (V1) uuzhl2 + f (V2) uuzhl1 V2
f (V1)u+ f (V2)u
w = w − τ
or
τ =
Ã
1−
¡
ωhh − ωll
¢ f (V1) uuzhl2 + f (V2) uuzhl1 V2
f (V1)u+ f (V2)u
!
w
The tax is positive if
ωhl−ωll
u f (V1)uz
hl
2 +
ωhh−ωhl
u f (V2)uz
hl
1
f (V1)u+ f (V2)u
< 1
Then
ωhh − ωhl
u
=
2zhl1¡
2zhl1 − 1
¢ ¡
2+δ−r
r
¢
+
¡
1 + δ − A¯
¢ ¡λ− A¯¢
ωhl − ωll
u
=
2zhl2¡
2zhl1 − 1
¢ ¡
2+δ−r
r
¢
+ 1 + δ − A¯+
¡
2zhl1 − 1
¢ ¡
A¯− δ
¢ ¡λ− A¯¢
Noticing that 1 + δ − A¯ < 2+δ−rr ,it follows that the first ratio decreases with zhl1 . Thus
it is smaller than 1 if the value at zhl1 = 1/2 is less than 1. This is the case if
λ−A¯
1+δ−A¯ ≤ 1
or if λ ≤ 1 + δ. Moreover ωhl−ωllu ≤
ωhh−ωhl
u because z
hl
2 <
1
2
< zhl1 and A¯ > δ. Thus
both ratios are smaller than 1 if λ < 1 + δ. It follows that
ωhl−ωll
u f (V1)uz
hl
2 +
ωhh−ωhl
u f (V2)uz
hl
1
f (V1)u+ f (V2)u
< zhl2 + z
hl
1 = 1.
as required for positive tax to be optimal.
Case of δ > A
Proof of Proposition 8. (i) and (ii) follow from the proofs of Lemma 1 and of
Corollary 5. The diﬀerence is that in the range wu < V <
w
u¯ , the second mover follows
the choice of the first one. The first mover then chooses l since ullV > uhlV − w >
uhhV − w.¥
The invariance of the other results (though Proposition 6 (iii) clearly does not
apply) is proven by following the same procedures as for the case of δ < A.
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